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Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang,MIT Sloan School
Executive Summary
Innovations can often be targetedto be more valuable forsome consumers than others. This is especially true fordigital information goods. Weshow that the
traditional price system not onlyresults in significant deadweight loss,but also provides incorrect incentivesto the creators of these innovations.in contrast, we propose and analyze a profit-maximizingmechanism for bundles of digital goods which is more efficientand more accurately providesinnovation incen- tives for information goods. Our"statistical couponing mechanism"does not rely on the universal excludabilityof information goods, whichcreates substan- tial deadweight loss, but insteadestimates social value created fromnew goods and innovations by offeringcoupons to a relatively small sample ofrepresenta- tive consumers. We find that thestatistical couponing mechanismcan operate with less than 0.1 percent of thedeadweight loss of the traditionalprice-based system, while more accurately aligningincentives with social value.
I. Introduction
Background
Innovation is an important driverof firm productivity andsocial wel-
fare for goods in general,and for digital informationgoods in partic-
ular. The ultimate outcomeof these innovations, whetherfor music,
software or other informationgoods, is improvedconsumer value. For
the society, as longas the expected cost of introducingan innovation
is smaller than the expectedbenefit (social welfare), theinnovation should be encouraged.
Firms, however,may not always want to innovate inthese circum-
stances. In general, they innovateonly if the expected profitis higher than the expectedcost. Furthermore, theymay undertake someBrynjolfssofl and Thang
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innovations which areprofitable but do not increase netsocial wel-
fare. Firms' profit objectives areusually not completelyaligned with
the society's social welfareobjectives, and when thishappens, there is
deadweight loss.
In the traditional price system,the objective of firm profit isaligned
with the objective of socialwelfare on'y when the priceof a good is
set at the marginal costof producing the good. Thisis usually unat-
tainable in the real world, and weshow below that even whensocial
efficiency is ensured (firmssetting price equal to themarginal cost),
innovation incentives are still notcorrectly provided to the firmsfrom
a socialplanner's point of view. Fordigital information goods, where
marginal cost of copies approaches zero,the price system is particularly
problematic. Not surprisingly,business models for digitalinformation
are often chaotic,confusing, and unstable.
In this paper, we establish asimple framework to studyhow an
innovation can change theconsumer's valuations, and weidentify two
types of innovations:uniform enhancement andtargeted innovation.
We show that the traditionalprice system cannotgenerally provide
correct innovation incentivesfor firms to innovate, and abetter price
system should berewarding creators based ontheir social contribu-
tions. Our proposedmechanism addresses this issuefor digital goods
with the help of the uniqueproperty of digital goods,namely, the near
zero marginal costof these goods. Interestingly,it is this very prop-
erty that creates seriouspricing issues for the variousdigital goods
industries. For example,digitized music has beenblamed for the
decline in music CD sales since2001. The availability ofdigital music
is said to threaten theincentives for innovationand creativity itself
in this industry. It hasengendered a ferocious backlash,with thou-
sands of lawsuits, fierce lobbyingin Congress, major publicrelations
campaigns, sophisticateddigital rights management systems(DRMs),
and lively debate all around.Music is not the only industryaffected.
Software, news, stock quotes,magazine publishing, gaming,classified
ads, phone directories, movies,telephony, postal services, radiobroad-
casting, and photography arejust a few of the otherindustries also
in the midst of transformation.Two predictions can bemade with
near certainty aboutthe next decade: the costsof storing, process-
ing and transmittingdigital information will dropby at least another
ten-fold and the vast majorityof commercial informationwill be
digitized.Innovation Incentives for InformationGoods 101
The debate reflects two opposingeconomic ideas. On one hand, the
near-zero marginal costs of reproducing digitalgoods suggests that
static welfare, the sum ofconsumer and producer surplus, would be
maximized by making these goods availableat zero price. In that way,
all consumers witha value greater than the marginal cost, i.e.,zero,
would have access to them, and deadweightloss would be minimized.
On the other hand, a zero price wouldprovide no revenues to thecre-
ators of the goods, and thusno incentives for their creation in the first
place, leading to potentiallyeven larger losses of social welfare over
time.
Thus, the debate centerson who will be impaled on the two horns of
the dilemma: should creators be deprivedof the rewards from theircre-
ations or should users be deprived ofgoods which cost nothing topro-
duce? Either approach is demonstrablysuboptimal (e.g., Lessig 2004).
It would seem impossible to have bothefficiency and innovation when
it comes to digital goods. Improvingone goal appears to be inextricably
intertwined with hurting the other goal.
Preview of the Paper
In this paper, we explore the possibilityof a third way. In particular,
we develop and analyze a method for providingimproved incentives
for innovation to the creators ofdigital goods. We show that it ispos-
sible to decouple thepayments to the innovators from the chargesto
consumers while still maintaining budget balance.In this way, we can
deliver strong incentives yet unhinderedaccess to the goods for almost
all interested consumers. In fact;we find that our system actually pro-
vides better incentives for innovationthan the traditional pricesystem,
even if the traditions system is bolstered bypowerful DRMs and new
laws to enhance excludability and thusmonopoly power.
We argue that in somecases it may be misguided to try to force the
old paradigm of excludabilityonto digital goods without modification.
Ironically, DRMs and new lawsare often used to strip digital goods of
one of their most appealing and economically-beneficialattributesthe
ease of widespread use. At the same time,we take seriously the need
to reward innovators financially ifwe wish to continue to encourage
innovation and creativity.
The essence of our mechanism isto (1) aggregate a large number of
relevant digital goods together and sellthem as a bundle and then (2)102 Brynjolfsson and Zhang
allocate the revenues from thisaggregation to each of the contributors
to the bundle in proportion tothe value they contribute, using statisti-
cal sampling and targeted coupons.We do this in a way which isfully
budget-balancing (meaning no outsidesubsidy needed for the system
to work) efficiency losses assmall as 0.1 percent of the traditionalprice
system. Furthermore, ourmechanism provides substantially better
incentives for content creation than a"perfect" implementation of the
traditional price based system wheregoods are sold individually and
creators keep 100 percent ofthe revenues.
Large digital collections areincreasingly common as much Internet
content moves from free to fee-based systemsand as new forms of digi-
tal content, such as satellite radio, emerge.Consider the bundles that
constitute XM radio, Cable TV,AOL content, Rhapsody music, Con-
sumer Reports reviews,JSTOR academic articles, and MicrosoftOffice
software.
Bundling has been analyzed in somedepth in the academic literature,
including a cluster of articlesspecifically focusing on the bundling of
digital information goods (e.g.,Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, 2000 and
the references therein). A key findingfrom the literature is that in equi-
librium, very large bundles ofinformation goods can provide content
that is accessible to the vast majorityof the consumers in the relevant
market. It will not be profitable toexclude (via pricing) any consumers
except the small fraction who haveimprobably low valuations for an
improbably large number of the goods inthe bundle. Thus, bundling
can dramatically increaseeconomic efficiency in the allocation ofinfor-
mation goods to consumers.
Given the prior literature on bundlinginformation goods, our paper
focuses on the second part of themechanism, which involves designing
a system for allocating revenuesfrom such a bundle. This is necessary
because by its very nature, bundlingdestroys the critical knowledge
about how much each of the goods inthe bundle is valued by consum-
ers. Did the consumersubscribe to XM radio for the classicalmusic or
for some other piece of content that wasin the bundle? How much did
the consumer value each of thesecomponents? Unlike for unbundled
goods, the consumer's purchase behaviorfor the bundle does not auto-
matically reveal the answers to thesequestions. This creates a problem
when it comes time to reward the creatorsand providers of the compo-
nent goods. Surveys, usagedata and managerial "instinct" canall help
allocate revenue to reward content creators,but none is likely to be as
accurate as a true price-based system.Innovation Incentives for Information Goods 103
Our mechanism re-introduces prices, butonly for a tiny fraction of
consumers. For instance, in a large-scale implementation,only 1,000
consumers out of several million would faceany prices for individual
goods, typically via specialcoupons. Because of the law of largenum-
bers, this allows us to get fairlyaccurate, unbiased assessments of value
of the good as long as theseconsumers are chosen randomly, or better
yet, representatively. However, because thevast majority of consumers
do not face any non-zero price forindividual goods, they incur virtu-
ally no inefficiency. Specifically, 99.9percent of users have access to any
given good as long as their value for thatgood is greater thanzero and
their values for all other goods in thebundle are not simultaneously
unusually low.1
In particular, our paper introducesa "statistical couponing mecha-
nism" and argues that it is technically feasibleand that it can dominate
any of the approaches debated thus far. Barriersto diffusion and assim-
ilation of this approachare likely to include overcoming knowledge
barriers and somemeasure of organizational and institutional learning.
Our analysis is meant to bea first step in addressing these obstacles.
Notably, if this innovation succeeds,it should actually increase thepace
of future innovations by improving incentivesfor the creation of use-
ful digital goods. At a minimum,a broader discussion of this type of
approach should change the terms of theexisting debate about busi-
ness models for digital goods.
In the remainder of this section,we review the related literature. Sec-
tion II analyzes the incentives forinnovation under the standard price
system and shows how they are incorrect.Section III discusses some
possible ways to address this issue usingIT, as well as the weaknesses
of each of these alternatives. Section IVintroduces our statisticalcou-
poning mechanism in detail and provides simulationsthat demonstrate
its high efficiency when the numberof consumers is reasonably large.
Section V provides some remarkson the feasibility of our mechanism
and section VI concludes witha brief summary.
Related Literature
The academic literature relatedto our analysis is somewhatsparse.
Some of the closest research is thework on a monopolist facingan
unknown demand curve (e.g., Aghionet al. 1991) where it is shown
that the seller can experiment by pricingto different buyers sequen-
tially and updating the price accordingly.In addition, as discussed104 Brynjolfsson and Zhang
later in our paper, Spence (1976) discusses somerelated problems with
incentives for investments in improvingquality
We are not aware of any systemswhich fully implement both parts of
our mechanism,although bits and pieces are used in variousindustries
and applications. For instance, asnoted above, there are many exam-
ples of bundling for digital goods.Revenue allocation similar to our
approach is more difficult to find. TheAmerican Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) doesseek to monitor the consump-
tion of its members' works anddistribute its revenues to each creator
in rough proportion to this consumption.However, they generally do
not use direct price data andthus typically work under theimplicit
assumption that all songs have equalvalue to each listener.
Wiffiam Fisher's (2004) book exploresvarious solutions to the music
piracy problem brought about bythe new peer-to-peer technology.
Specifically, he proposes to replace major portionsof the copyright and
encryption-based models with a "governmentallyadministered reward
system." He correctly points out that to assessthe correct level of these
rewards, what we really need is not thenumber of downloads, but the
"frequency with which each recording islistened to or watched" (i.e.,
the real value to consumers). Fisher'sproposal is similar to the Nielsen
TV sampling approach, and he proposes toimplement special devices
to estimate the frequencyof listenings of each recording. He also sug-
gests that the frequency shouldbe multiplied by the duration ofthe
works, and that consumer's intensityof enjoyment, obtained through a
voting system, should be taken intoconsideration to make more precise
estimates of the valuations.
This proposal, if carried out, could besuperior to the current prac-
tice taken by ASCAP (BMI, SESAC,etc.) to compensate the creators
of musical works, and it comes very nearto the ideal of learning con-
sumers' valuations and distribute moneyaccordingly; but it also suf-
fers from several inherent problems.First, unlike from Nielson TV
sampling, people may use different devices toenjoy the same digital
content. For example, a song can beplayed with an MP3 player in the
car, a CD player in thehome entertainment system, or a DVDdrive on
a computer. Second,and more critically, as shown in the publicgoods
literature, a voting system such asthat proposed by Fisher is not reli-
able because individual hidden incentives caninduce voters to misrep-
resent their true values. For instance, consumersmight falsely claim to
have an extremely high or low valuefor a good in an attempt to influ-
ence the voting. hi essence,the Fisher approach still does not provide aInnovation Incentives for InformationGoods 105
reliable, incentive-compatibleway to determine the true value of each
good to consumers.2
II.Incorrect Innovation Incentives
Providing correct innovation incentivescan be an issue for information
goods. It is important to note thatinnovation incentivesare often
dramatically incorrect in thetraditional pricing mechanism.This is
exacerbated not only by thevery low marginal costs of information
goods, but also by anotherproperty, their enormous malleability and
flexibility. Unlike most physicalgoods made of atoms, goods madeof
bits can easily be redesigned andreconfigured. Accordingly, unlike in
traditional manufacturing andservice industries, thecore production
workers, at companies that produceinformation goods like software
work on changing the design ofexisting products and introducingnew
ones, not on manufacturing and distributingcopies of existing designs,
which is relatively trivial bycomparison. This means that innovations
in information goodscan be highly targeted to specificconsumer seg-
ments, if the seller so desires.
The traditional price system basedon excludability does an impres-
sive job in allocatingresources and encouraging innovation. Weargue
that the traditional pricingmechanism, however, doesnot ordinar-
ily provide correct innovationincentives to producers of information
goods.
Suppose that the sellercan invest in trying to create an innovation
which improves consumers' valuationsof her product. The investment
can be in the form of improving product quality,functionality, or edu-
cating users to use the productmore effectively. We now give a closer
look at the innovation incentivesof the seller.
In the next sections, all resultsare depicted with figures of arbitrary
demand curves.
Uniform Enhancement
We begin with the simplecase of an innovation that affects allconsum-
ers equally. In particular, suppose the innovationcan increase each
consumer's valuation by 8. This is equivalentto moving the demand
curve upward by 8.
When the demand is shifted upward,the monopolistic seller will be
charging a new price p' =+ e that maximizes her profit. With this106
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innovation, she can expect to gain someadditional profit indicated
by the shaded area infigure 4.1. In the figure, althoughthe potential
value the seller has created forsociety is the area betweenthe two
demand curves, in thetraditional price system (with a singleprice
for the good), she getsadditional revenue and profit indicatedby the
shaded area. This shaded area is also,therefore, the amount of incentive
for creating the innovationtheseller will pursue such innovationsif
the expected value is greaterthan the expected cost. The areas repre-
senting the value of the innovationto society and the valueof the inno-
vation to the seller are notnecessarily equal. Part of the seller'sprofit
from the innovation comesfrom transferring surplus betweenthe con-
sumer and the seller,which has no net benefit to society.On the other
hand, part of the profit also comesfrom reducing the deadweightloss
to a certain extent, whichdoes improve social welfare. Thus,depending
on the exact shapeof the demand curve, the incentivesfor innovation
can be inaccurate.
Figure 4.1
A uniform upward shift of demand curve.Innovation Incentives for InformationGoods 107
Targeted Innovation
Incentives are particularly misalignedfor innovations whichcan be
targeted, so they affect onlya small subset of consumers' valuations.
In particular, the innovationmay be less significant so that onlysome
consumers with valuation near someare affected. For instance, con-
sider three cases. a software developercould invest in adding features
that could
make satisfied users of its producteven more satisfied,
increase the value toconsumers whose values were just below the
market price, turning them into buyers,or
increase the value of non-buyers,but not enough to turn them into
buyers.
Suppose that the developer hasa limited budget and can only pursue
one of these three types of innovations. Evenif innovations of type (1)
or (3) might create more value for society, thetraditional price system
will only provide incentives forinnovation (2).
Figure 4.2 shows this graphically.3When the seller takessome
effort to innovate and createssome extra social value indicated by the






Social benefit/loss vis-à-vis seller innovation.108
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a fixed level of8, the possible region of innovationcannot be far
away from the optimalprice p'. This narrow range canbe indicated
by a pair of values:7L and VH. Inother words, for all values lower
than iL or higher thanH'the seller can not extractenough profit to
justify the cost of innovation, soonly innovation (2) will be carried
out under the traditionalprice system. This is veryintuitive. In the
traditional market, if the seller sellsgoods to consumers with valua-
tion higher than VH, it does nothelp to increase their valuationsfurther
because that will only contribute to consumersurplus, and the seller
will not be able to extract theadded value. Similarly, for the poten-
tial consumers with lowervaluations (lower than iLI to beprecise),
the seller will not take the effort toinnovate because these peoplewill
not be converted to consumers.For small 8. the range (L'7H) is very
small, and even in this range,innovation may not always besocially
desirable.
Thus, in the traditional pricemechanism, the seller has too little
incentive to create innovations thatmainly benefit consumers with very
low or very high valuations. If yourvaluation is substantially above or
below the equilibrium pricefor a good, don't expect the good's pro-
vider to put significant effort intoinnovating to specifically address
your needs.
Interestingly, even while under-investingin certain types of inno-
vations, the seller also has incentiveto over-invest in other typesof
innovations. To see the sociallywasteful incentive of innovation in the
traditional price system, consider the caseof the consumers' valua-
tions near the optimal price. Forexample, if the seller takes an effort
to innovate and increasesthe valuation for some consumersfrom p
to p + 8, but not for anyother consumers, then her optimaleffort is
proportional to the triangle indicatedby AJF, but her gains are as large
as the entire rectangleindicated by DIE When 8 is small, theratio of
the seller's incentives to theoptimal incentives can becomearbitrarily
large. In other words, meaningthat the seller can have radically exces-
sive incentives to innovate forpeople whose valuations are close tothe
optimal price p.
This is a striking result, that innovationfor people whose valuation
is just above the optimal pricewill reduce consumer surplus, yetthis is
exactly the range where it is mostprofitable for the sellers to innovate.
An innovation in thisneighborhood costs many times morethan the
value it creates would still beprofitably pursued.Innovation Incentives for Information Goods 109
Discussion
The issue with targeted innovationis but one manifestation of
misallocated (or narrowly-allocated)resources for creating values
for consumers. If we look atone product as a collection of functional
features, then the creator will betoo focused on innovations around
those features that cater to themarginal consumer (and thus ignoring
possible innovations for consumers with muchhigher or much lower
valuations). In a product bundle, throughthe traditional price system,
the bundler will immediatelyget a positive feedback if she introduces
a new product catering to the marginalconsumer as this will turn some
non-buyers to buyers. However, if sheintroduces an improvement to
the bundle that caters to the higher valuedconsumers, she cannot see
a corresponding profit. In the long run, this feedbackprocess will dis-
courage the bundler to introduce anything faraway from catering only
to the marginal buyers.
Spence (1976) studied the inability ofprices to convey informa-
tion about quality improvements in products.He argued that if firms
are not perfect price discriminators (i.e., if firmsare not paid accord-
ing to the social value they create), thenthe profits are not equal to
its net contribution to surplus, andsince "profitability is the criterion
by which products are selectedor rejected in a market system,... this
may not always lead to desirable results." Comparedwith deadweight
loss, this type of inefficiency has largely beenneglected in the litera-
ture. In the next sections, we will be examiningthe special property of
digital goods, and wepropose a pricing mechanism that avoids exactly
this kind of inefficiencyas well as the traditional deadweight loss
inefficiency.
III.Bundling and Mechanisms for ProvidingIncentives for Digital
Innovation
Bundling Can Reduce Deadweight Loss
As noted in the introduction, if themarginal cost of producing a good is
zero, charging any price greater than zero for that goodcan be socially
inefficient: some consumers (e.g., those withvaluations less than the
price but greater than zero) will be excluded fromconsuming the good
even though it would be socially beneficial for themto have access to it.110 Brynjolfsson and Zhang
The zero marginal cost of reproducingdigital goods has created huge
pricing problems for various industries:it takes work, talent, and luck
to create a successful CD,but once digitized as an MP3 file, anypiece of
music can be reproduced with virtually zerocost. The music industry
has been profoundly influenced by thisproperty of digital goods, and
we are very likely to see moreindustries follow suit. Technology has
enabled us to distribute digital goods moreefficiently, but we must find
the right mechanism to encouragetheir creation and to allocate them.
Without a good mechanism for digitalgoods, we will not be able to
provide sufficient innovation incentivesfor the creation of these digital
goods.
It is shown in Bakos and Brynjolfsson(1999) that, in certain cases,
bundling can be a partial solution for pricingof digital goods. By the
law of large numbers, it is easier tofind an optimal price for a bundle of
digital goods than for each individual good.In equilibrium, the profit
maximizing price for a large bundle will be setlow enough so that vir-
tually all consumers interested in anyof the goods in the bundle will
choose to buy the whole bundle (evenif they use only a small fraction
of its components). For instance, mostPC users buy Microsoft Office,
even if they don't useall its applications, or even not all of the features
of the applications that they do use.While there may be anti-competi-
tive implications (see Bakos andBrynjolfsson 2000), such bundling does
give the socially desirable resultof dramatically reducing the dead-
weight loss because fewer consumers areexcluded from using any of
the bundled goods in equilibrium. In essence, onceconsumers pay a
lump-sum to purchase the bundle, they can consumeany of the goods
in the bundle at zero marginal cost.Thus, when the cost of reproducing
the goods is close to zero, bundling canprovide close-to-optimal alloca-
tion of goods to consumers (Bakosand Brynjolfsson 1999).
However these benefits come at a major cost.Bundling inherently
destroys information about how eachof the component goods is val-
ued by consumers. Is the bundle sellingbecause of the fresh sounds of a
new artist or due to thelasting appeal of a traditional favorite?Without
this information, it is impossible toallocate revenues to the providers
of content in a way that accurately encouragesvalue creation. Selling
goods individually would automaticallysolve this problem, but as dis-
cussed above, individual sales create enormousinefficiencies because
they exclude some users with positivevalue from access to the good.
Basically, bundling helps to address theinnovation incentive prob-
lem by offering a viable businessmodel to reward the creators of digitalInnovation Incentives for Information Goods iii
goods with much less deadweight loss than a lacarte pricing. However,
bundling introduces another problem of innovationincentivesthis
mechanism does not give us a natural solutionto distribute the revenue
to provide correct incentives for each of the goods'creators. We will
discuss the revenue distribution problem in thenext section.
To illustrate the problem, we can makea simple comparison between
items sold in Wal-Mart and songs sold inan online subscription service
to digital goods. Every item in Wal-Mart willgo through the POS scan-
ner, so Wal-Mart knows if the blue jeans from Levi's sell better thanthe
jeans from Eddie Bauer's, and this informationcan be used to quickly
adjust purchasing and pricing. If Levi's produces betterjeans, the price
system will automatically reward thecompany with more revenues.
This is a very desirable situation for all parties: theconsumers can have
access to products they like, Wal-Mart can respond to the marketvery
quickly and ensure a competitive advantage, andmost importantly, the
creators of better products can get automatically rewarded.
When we observe a consumer subscribingto a bundle of digital
goods, however, we do not automatically know fromhis purchase
which song, feature, or other component he valuesmore, thus the cre-
ator of the favorite component can not be properly rewarded.It is inter-
esting to note that any form of bundling creates thisproblem, no matter
the components are digital or not. For example,when we see people
buying a subscription to cable TV,we do not automatically know which
channels they value more than others; when peoplebuy the Microsoft
office bundle, we do not automatically know whetherWord or Excel is
more valuable.
The Revenue Distribution Problem
The ideal revenue distribution mechanism would beone which some-
how determined each good's demandcurve, and distributed the rev-
enue among the content providers in proportion to the social valueof
each good to all consumers. This valuecan be calculated by integrating
the area below each good's demandcurve. Various mechanisms used
to derive demand curves proposed in the literature all fail herebecause
bundle pricing does not automatically provideways to observe the
market's response to a price change of individual goods.
If the benefits created by each goodcannot be observed or calculated,
then a host of inefficienciesmay result. First, the content providers may
not have enough incentives to produce creativeproducts in the first112 Brynjolfsson and Zhang
place, and consumers will eventually beharmed. Second, without a
good signal of consumers' preference, contentproviders may produce
content, but not the content that best fit theconsumers' taste. Third, in
any effort to overcome theseproblems, the collection of content produc-
ers may lead thepotential bundler to adopt other strategies such as a
la carte pricing. However, such strategiesre-introduce the deadweight
loss problem discussed at the beginning ofsection I.
In the following subsections, we discussthe costs and benefits of sev-
eral ways to distribute revenue to address thischallenge, culminating
with our proposed statistical couponing mechanism.
Payment Determined by Number of Downloads
In the context of digital information goods, it isoften natural to assume
that the seller may be able to observe thenumber of times that each
good is accessed. This gives us the followingapproach.
If one is willing to assume that the numberof accesses signals popu-
larity and popularity is a measure of value, we caninfer the value by
the number of accesses. Traditionally, this scheme isbroadly used in the
market of digital goods such as music, movie, TVshows, and software.
For example, each episode of Friends got about29 million viewers per
week in its last year, which was far more than mostother TV shows; as
a consequence, eachof the six stars was paid $1.2 million per episode,
far more than most other TV actors.
More formally, suppose we have n goods in thebundle, the price for
the bundle is B. Also suppose there are m buyersof the bundle, each
represented by] (] = 1,...,m), then the total bundle revenueis R = B . m.
We assume the system can record the numberof downloads of buyer]
for good i: d1, then the provider of content ishould be paid:
d
revenues = R (1)
1=1 k=1
This method is extremely easy to implement. Infact, the last equation
implies that the bundler does not even have to keeprecord of all the
downloads made by the m buyers, she can simplyrecord d1, the number
good i has been downloaded.
This method is powerful when all thegoods are approximately
equal in value. However, if goods differ in value(bundling very cheap
"Joke-A-Day" with more expensive "Forrester ResearchReport"), thenInnovation Incentives for InformationGoods 113
pricing based on number of downloadsis misleading. (The Joke-A-Day
may be downloaded more times than the ForresterResearch Report,
but aggregate value of the lattermay be much higher). Another prob-
lem with this method is that itgives dishonest content providersa way
to distort the values by manipulatingthe number of downloads of their
own content. This has been a problem, forinstance, with some advertis-
ing-supported content where pricesare based on thousands of impres-
sions recorded (Hu 2004).
Payment Determined by DownloadsCombined with a Stand-Alone
Price
Number of downloads itself isnot a good measure ofconsumer valu-
ation in many cases. Assuming therealso exists a stand-alone price for
every information good in the bundle, andassuming these pricesare
all fair prices, wecan then derive an improved mechanismto distribute
the revenue.
Consider the market introducedin the first subsection of part III. Sup-
pose each item i (i1,..,n) in the bundle also hasa stand-alone price p..
Building on the equation from thethird subsection, an improvedway






that says that therevenue to distribute to content provider i shouldbe a
proportion of the total revenue (R= B . m), and the proportion is deter-
mined by the sum of eachconsumer's valuation of goodj. This method has the advantage ofbeing more precise comparedto
the previous solution. Indeed, if"Joke-A-Day" is sold separately, its
price will probably be much lowerthan that of "Forrester Research
Report." The disadvantage of thismethod is that a fair andseparate
price may not always be readilyavailable. If the distribution ofrevenue
is set according to this method,and when bundling becomesa major
source of revenue, there is room for contentproviders to misrepresent
the stand-alone price. Furthermore,this approach implicitlyassumes
that the value from each good isproportional to the stand-alone price.
This will only be true, however, ifthe price paid by the marginalcon-
sumer of each good is proportional to theaverage price that would be
paid by all consumers of thatgood, for all goods.5114
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Discussion
As discussed above and inthe introduction, merely adding anaccount-
ing framework to thetraditional price system does not guarantee a
socially efficient outcome of distributingthe digital goods and provid-
ing correct innovationincentives to the sellers. In the nextsection, we
propose a mechanismthat goes beyond the excludability-basedtradi-
tional price system.
IV.Statistical Couponing Mechanism
Description of the Mechanism
As discussed in the last section,the ideal way to provide correct incen-
tives is to learn consumers'valuations for each good and make cor-
responding payments. Since bundlingitself obscures consumers'
valuations for individual goods, here wepropose a mechanism to
reveal the demand curve for eachgood by issuing targeted coupons
to a small sample of consumers.For large populations, it ispossible
for the targeted sample to be largeenough to be representative statisti-
cally while still being smallenough to be fairly unimportanteconomi-
cally. Our mechanism is substantiallydifferent from the traditional use
of coupons as a marketingmethod to price discriminate consumers.
Instead, coupons in our mechanism aresimilar to the price experiments
suggested in the optimal pricing literature.
Suppose the monopolisticbundler offers a bundle of information
goods to a group of consumers.In order to derive the demand curve
for one of the components, wechoose inn representative consumers
and issue each of them a single coupon,where n is the number of price
levels covering the range of thevaluations, which we call "couponlev-
els," and m is the number of couponsto be offered for each ofthe price
levels in total, which we call"sample points." While m n shouldbe
large enough to make statisticallyvalid inferences, it can nonetheless be
a very small fraction(e.g., 1 / 1000 or less) of the total setof consumers
buying the bundle.
If a consumer receives a couponwith face value it', then he caneither
choose to ignore the coupon andenjoy the complete bundle orchoose to
redeem the coupon and forfeit theright to use a particular component
of the bundle, which isindicated on the coupon. So uponobserving
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valuation for that component is higheror lower than the face value of
that particular coupon. Aggregating them consumers' valuations will
give the bundler a good estimate of the valuationsat that price; summa-
rizing the results for the n coupon levels, the bundlercan plot a fairly
accurate demand curve.6 The area under the resulting demandcurve,
when scaled up to the whole population, is thetotal social valuation for
that particular good, and also the maximumrevenue which that good
can contribute to the bundle revenue. Using thesame method for all
the components, the bundler can learn theapproximate social valua-
tion and revenue potential of each of the goods inthe bundle. She can
then distribute the revenueamong the content providers according to
their contribution share to the total valuation.Let R be the total revenue
from selling bundles, and i be the social valueof the component i in the
bundle, content provider of i should be paid
revenue1
j=1I
where N is the total number of content providers.
Comparison with Other Methods for ProvidingInnovation
Incentives
This method compares favorably to the traditionalprice mechanism.
The traditional price mechanism subjects 100percent of consumers to
the inefficiency of positive prices. However, only datafrom a small frac-
tion of consumers are needed to get fairly accurateestimates of the value
created and contributed by each good. Thegreater precision obtained
by increasing the sample declines asymptoticallyto zero while the cost
for subjecting each additionalconsumer to a positive price remains
just as high for the last consumer sampledas the first one. When bal-
ancing the costs and benefits, the optimal samplesize is almost surely
less than 100 percent. Secondly, the proposedcouponing mechanism
actually provides a more accurate estimate of the overalldemand curve
than any single-price traditional system.Because multiple different
prices for coupons are offered, a muchmore accurate overall picture of
demand can be obtained than simply revealing thedemand at a single
price, as conventional prices do. As discussed insection I, this has large
and important implications for dynamic efficiencyand innovation
incentives.
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One can also compare our couponingmechanism with the well-
known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)mechanism. Unlike VCG, our
mechanism does not give us exact valuationsfor each consumer. How-
ever, in general, approximatedemand functions of the components will
suffice, and by increasing the sample size, the accuracy canbe made
almost arbitrarily precise. Our mechanism issuperior to the VCG
mechanism in several ways. (1) Truth-telling is arobust and strong
equilibrium in the couponing mechanism, inthe sense that each con-
sumer simply compares hisvaluation with the coupon's face value; he
is not required to assign correct beliefs onall other people's votes. (2)
In the VCG, if one respondent misreportshis value (due to irrational-
ity or due to error), the consequence maybe very severe for the rest
of the people. Furthermore, coalitions of consumers can"game" the
VCG to their advantage. However, in thecouponing mechanism, the
effects on others from a consumer's misreport areminimal. (3) The cou-
poning mechanism is fully budget balancing,unlike the VCG. (4) The
couponing mechanism is more intuitive thanthe VCG for real world
problems.
Simulation Results for the Mechanism
It can be shown that for any one of the componentsin the bundle, given
a large number ofrandomly chosen respondents and level of coupons,
the above mechanism gives an empiricaldemand function that arbi-
trarily approximates the true demand function(see Brynjolfsson and
Zhang 2004). We can also run simulations to seethe effectiveness of this
mechanism (see figure 4.3).
The use of our coupon mechanism gives usempirical estimates of
the inverse demand curves for each of thedistributions, and we define
the error rates to be the percentage differencesbetween the area under
the empirical demand curve and the areaunder the true demand curve.
Figure 4.3 shows the result of the couponmechanism applied to the uni-
form distribution; other distributions yield similarfigures. We see that
error rate is declining with more couponlevels and with more sample
points for each coupon value. With just 20 couponlevels, the error rate
is as low as five percent. Adding moresample points for each coupon
value also helps to improve the precision. Forexample, with 40 coupon
levels, sampling 20 consumers for each couponlevel (for a total of 800
respondents) gives us an error rate of ten percent, andsampling 80 con-



















Simulation results for the couponing mechanism.
rate curves, we can also see that when sampling 20consumers, adding
coupon levels beyond ten does not improve the precision significantly;
also, when sampling 80 consumers, addingcoupon levels beyond 15
does not improve the precision significantly. Thisobservation tells us
that we have to add coupon levels and samplingpoints simultaneously
in order to achieve the best result estimating thesocial values of goods.
Error rate converges toward zeromore quickly for fatter demand curves
(the ones with a higher expected value). Inour simulations, for some
demand curves, with just five coupon levels and 20sample points (for a
mere 100 respondents), the mechanism can give us an errorrate below
0.1 percent. Thus, sampling just 100consumers can provide almost as
accurate an estimate of demand as sampling the entirepopulation of
consumers of the good, which could be in the millions.
The deadweight loss is proportionately smaller,too. Consumers who
cash-in the coupons forgo access to the correspondinggood, which cre-
ates a deadweight loss (unless the consumer's valuewas exactly zero).
For such a consumer, this decision is analogousto facing a market price,
with similar costs, benefits and overallincentives. In contrast to the
traditional price approach, however,our mechanism only subjects a
Decrease in error with more coupons or more samples
10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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fraction of consumers to this decision, so only afraction choose not
to buy, and the total deadweightloss is only a fraction of what it used
to be.
This mechanism can be used to solve the revenuedistribution prob-
lem discussed in section III, and we can showthat this mechanism can
also help to avoid the innovation incentive issuesarising in traditional
price systems:
If an innovation can increase only someconsumers' valuations, the
traditional price system does not provide correctincentives for the pro-
ducer to innovate for people with relativelyhigh or relatively low valu-
ations. In contrast, the proposed mechanismalways gives the producer
socially desirable level of incentives to innovate,and
As shown in the analysis in section II, thetraditional price system
gives the producer too high an incentive to innovatewhere it is most
harmful to the social welfare, and no incentiveelsewhere; the proposed
mechanism induces the producer to make sociallydesirable innovation
efforts.
V.Remarks on Feasibility
This paper contributes to establishing a more efficientapproach to cre-
ate, distribute and consume digitalgoods. The theoretical foundation
proposed here is just the first step toward thisgoal; in order to build
viable business models, we need to address somepractical issues to be
discussed below.
In this paper, couponing has been analyzedsolely as a mechanism for
revealing existing demand, not for influencing it.Of course, in practice,
couponing may also be viewed as a form of advertisingthat increases
demand. If it increases demand for some goods,and not for others, then
the estimated values may be biased in anon-uniform fashion.
There is a related, more conspicuous problem:due to the heteroge-
neity in people's tastes, some goods aresurely downloaded less than
some others (consider an analyst'sresearch report; maybe only tens out
of millions of consumers would want todownload it). If we do not
offer enough sampling points, there will be abigger error in estimating
demand for these less popular goods.
Both issues can be addressed by a practice wecall "passive coupon-
ing." Under "passive couponing" regime,only those who downloaded
a good will be offered a couponfor that good. After downloading, the
consumer learns all the productcharacteristics, so the informative roleInnovation Incentives for InformationGoods 119
of couponing as advertising isno longer valid. For goods downloaded
by the majority of people,we can choose a small fraction out of them to
offer coupons, and for goods downloadedonly by a few, we may offer
coupons to most or all of them. In eithercase, subsequent access to that
good, or similar goods,can be restricted for consumers who preferto
redeem the coupon instead. Bydiscriminating coupons offeredto dif-
ferent types of goods,we can get a better overall estimate of the specific
demands.7
In previous sections, we didnot consider the issue of contract dura-
tion. It is likely to beunnecessary to permanently blockaccess to a
good for consumers who redeem thecorresponding coupon. Tempo-
rary blockage will generally suffice. Wecan put this question into the
context of subscription-based business models.Suppose the bundle is
to be paid by month (e.g., $20/month), thenfor time-critical informa-
tion goods (e.g., news, stockquotes, etc.), we can offer thecoupons by
month, too (e.g., "Take this $1coupon and give up access to CNN news
for the next month"). For those lesstime-critical information goods
(e.g., music, software updates, etc.),we can offer the coupons by longer
periods (e.g., "Take this $10coupon and give up access to music by
Madonna for the next year").
What if the valuationsare not independent as assumed in the paper?
If two goods are substitutes, offeringa coupon for one of them will only
help us to estimate the incrementalvalue that it brings to the bundle,
and this is also true for the othergood, so we will be paying less for
the two creators than the value theybring into the bundle. Similarly,
for complements, we overestimatetotal value of the goods. Ifwe can
identify clusters of goods thatare substitutes or complements to each
other, we can offer coupons for individualclusters and use the pro-
posed mechanism to estimate the shareof contribution by each clus-
ter. This will ensure that a cluster ofcontent providers will be paida
fair overall payment. Withina cluster, each individual content provider
can be paid according to the estimated share ofincremental value they
bring to the cluster.
VI.Conclusion
Major innovations in technologiesoften engender innovations in busi-
ness organizations. The digitization of informationis no exception. We
seek to advance the debateon how best to allocate digital goods and
reward their creators by introducing andexploring a novel mechanism
and analyzing its implications.120 Brynjolfsson and Zhang
Our approach eliminates themarginal cost of consuming digital
information goods for the vast majorityof consumers via massive bun-
dling. For very large aggregations,this preserves most of the static effi-
ciency which could be achievedwith a zero price policy. However, in
the long run, the more importantissue is how to create incentivesfor
ongoing innovation. Indeed, ourliving standards, and those of future
generations depend far more oncontinuing innovation than on sim-
ply dividing upthe existing set of digital goods. Inthis area, the pro-
posed statistical couponing mechanismshows particular promise. We
find that our approach can providesubstantially better incentives for
innovation than even the traditionalmonopoly price system bolstered
by artificial excludability (e.g.,via DRMs, laws, etc.). In particular,the
traditional price system, in which eachgood is sold for a specific price
with the proceeds going to themonopolist creator, focuses virtually on
incentives on a very narrow band ofconsumersthose just on the mar-
gin of buying. In fact, the pricesystem provides too strongincentives
for innovations that help this narrow groupof consumers. Rents trans-
ferred to the creator from suchinnovations exceed the social benefits.
In contrast, our approach, usingstatistical sampling and couponing,
can provide incentiveswhich are nearly optimal for every typeof
innovation.
In summary the mechanism weintroduce,
potentially has orders of magnitudeless inefficient than the tradi-
tional price system,
is budget balancing, requiring noexternal inflows of money,
works with existing technologyand existing legal framework,
requires no coercion and can becompletely voluntary for all parties,
since it is fully incentive compatible,
doesn't assume that innovators willcontinue to innovate even with-
out financial rewards,
can be implemented and runin real-time, and
is scalable to very large numbersof goods and consumers (in fact, it
works better for larger numbers).
Our approach also has weaknessesand challenges. Compared to giv-
ing away all digital goods forfree, our approach will exclude asmall
number of consumers and create someinefficiency as a result. More
importantly, our approach does requirethe creation of new business
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needed to manage the statisticalsampling and couponing, analyzethe
resulting data, and allocatepayments to the content owners accord-
ingly. Near misses for thistype of entity already exist. Forinstance,
ASCAP does much thesame thing already for broadcast music, but
without accurate price information.Nielsen and similar organizations
provide usage information, butagain without accurate price informa-
tion. There are organizations thatregularly collect and distribute large
sums of money to member companies basedon various algorithms.
The Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation, which does this for banks,
is one example. Somecooperatives are also run this way. Last butper-
haps not least, thegovernment regularly makes these types oftrans-
actions. It should be stressed, however,that our mechanism doesnot
require any government role sinceall of the participants (consumers,
content creators, bundlers) have incentivesto participate completely
voluntarily and it adheres to theexisting legal framework. Thisstands
in contrast to the proposal byFisher (2004) or the variedproposals to
change copyright or other laws.
By offering this new frameworkand analysis, with anew set of
opportunities and challenges, we hopeto lay the foundation for future
research on the critical question ofproviding incentives for innova-
tion in the creation of digitalcontent and implementing mechanisms
to deliver that content toconsumers efficiently. Furthermore, the prob-
lems that we analyze with existinginstitutions for providing innovation
incentives apply to a greateror lesser degree to many other products
and services, not just digital goods,and variants on the mechanismwe
describe can also be useful in thoseother contexts.
We expect that the next tenyears will likely witness a scale of organi-
zational innovation for creating anddistributing digital goodssurpass-
ing even the remarkablepace of the last ten years. New coordination
mechanisms, such as the innovationincentive approach described and
analyzed in this paper will flourish.With a proactive attitude toward
technology-enabled organizational innovation,we believe that aca-
demia can speed thisprocess by framing the issues, and by providing
tools and analyses.
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Endnotes
The efficiency properties of largebundles of information goods is analyzed inin Bakos
and Brynjolfsson (1999).
The public goods mechanism design literatureseeks to provide a remedy to the voter
misrepresentation problem. Specifically, theVCG mechanism can be shown toinduce
truth-telling by all participants. However,it has two fatal flaws. First, it is notbudget-
balancing significant inflows (or netpenalties) are generally needed. Second, it isquite
fragile. Each participant must believethat all other participants are truth-telling orhe
wifi not tell the truth himself.Accordingly, while VCG design is intriguing intheory, it is
rarely, if ever, seen in practice.
A more formal analysis can befound in our companion paper, Brynjolfssonand Zhang
(2005).
If a single seller cannot provide a largeenough number of information goods to
achieve the benefits of massive bundling,it can be worthwhile to have a content aggrega-
tor to negotiate with multiplesellers to offer a bundle of informationgoods from multiple
sources.
Barro and Romer (1987) explore howsimilar proportionalities can explain anumber
of pricing anomolies.
An alternative approach to revealing consumerdemand would be to reverse the
default consumption rights of the consumerswhich were targeted. The targeted
consumer would be required to paythe specified offer price in order toobtain access
to the selected good. Consumerswho did not pay the relevant pricewould not have
access to that good Aswith the coupons, only consumers with avalue greater than the
relevant offer prices would choose to consumethe good,thereby revealing the demand
curve.
What if a good is only downloadedby one consumer? First of all, in this case,this
good is not important in the bundle, thebundler can exclude it in the future. Second,the
bundler can offer this consumer a different couponin each period with the face value
determined by a random draw. Within someperiods of sampling, the bundler can still
extract the true value, the mathworks exactly the same as in the proofof proposition 1.
It can also be easily shown thatthere is no incentive for the consumer tomisreport his
value in each period.
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